SMP, Inc, a Pennsylvania corporation v. Thayco Manufacturing, Inc., a corporation; Fleet Sales and Leasing Company, a corporation, AJ Industries, Inc., a corproation, Reyco Industries, Inc., a corporation, and erie Wheels Division of Erie Malleable Iron Company, a corporation : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1990
SMP, Inc, a Pennsylvania corporation v. Thayco
Manufacturing, Inc., a corporation; Fleet Sales and
Leasing Company, a corporation, AJ Industries,
Inc., a corproation, Reyco Industries, Inc., a
corporation, and erie Wheels Division of Erie
Malleable Iron Company, a corporation : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joseph N. Nemelka, Jr.; Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant.
Raymond M. Berry; Richard A. Van Wagoner; Snow, Christensen & Martineau; Attorneys for
Defendants/Respondents.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, SMP v. Thayco, No. 900298 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2693
o n i c r 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
£xKETNO.<XM*qf-<* 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SMP, INC, a Pennsylvania 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
v s
- ^ „ . - • 
THAYCO MANUFACTURING, I N C . , a Case No. 90fr9~28-CA 
corporation; FLEET SALES AND 
LEASING COMPANY, a (Argument Priority No. 14.b) 
corporation, AJ INDUSTRIES, 
INC., a corporation, REYCO 
INDUSTRIES, INC., a 
corporation, and ERIE WHEELS 
DIVISION OF ERIE MALLEABLE 
IRON COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendants/Respondents 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS 
REYCO INDUSTRIES, INC. and AJ INDUSTRIES, INC. 
Appeal from an Order of Partial Summary Judgment 
of the Fourth Judicial District Court, 
Utah County, State of Utah 
Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen 
RAYMOND M. BERRY (A0310) 
RICHARD A. VAN WAGONER (A4690) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: 521-9000 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Respondents Reyco Industries 
Inc. and AJ irfaiidtifieyr S*^ -
JOSEPH N. NEMELKA, JR. (A5326) f • «« 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
7001 South 900 East, Suite 210A JUN 2 5 199Q 
Midvale, UT 84047 
Mary T. Noontn 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SMP, INC, a Pennsylvania 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
THAYCO MANUFACTURING, INC., a Case No. 900928-CA 
corporation; FLEET SALES AND 
LEASING COMPANY, a (Argument Priority No. 14.b) 
corporation, AJ INDUSTRIES, 
INC., a corporation, REYCO 
INDUSTRIES, INC., a 
corporation, and ERIE WHEELS 
DIVISION OF ERIE MALLEABLE 
IRON COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS 
REYCO INDUSTRIES, INC. and AJ INDUSTRIES, INC. 
Appeal from an Order of Partial Summary Judgment 
of the Fourth Judicial District Court, 
Utah County, State of Utah 
Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen 
RAYMOND M. BERRY (A0310) 
RICHARD A. VAN WAGONER (A4690) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: 521-9000 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Respondents Reyco Industries 
Inc. and AJ Industries, Inc. 
JOSEPH N. NEMELKA, JR. (A5326) 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
7001 South 900 East, Suite 210A 
Midvale, UT 84047 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
I. JURISDICTION 1 
II. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 1 
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
IV. DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 1 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
A. Nature Of The Case 2 
B. Course of Proceedings And Disposition Below. . . . 3 
C. Statement Of Facts And Citations To The Record. . . 5 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 10 
VII. ARGUMENT 11 
POINT I 
SMP WAIVED THE ISSUES IT RAISES 
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 11 
A. Due Process Violation Based On claimed 
Inadequate Notice. 12 
B. Granting Summary Judgment Before Plaintiff 
Had Opportunity To Conduct Its Discovery. . . 12 
C. Reyco's Installation Instructions To Thayco 
Were Inadequate 13 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD ASSUME THE CORRECTNESS OF THE JUDGMENT 
BELOW 13 
POINT III 
SMP WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS 15 
POINT IV 
THE RECORD CONTAINS NO FACTS TO SUPPORT A PRIMA FACIE 
CASE AGAINST AJ/REYCO UNDER ANY OF SMP'S THEORIES . . . 20 
POINT V 
SMP STATES NO COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR PRODUCT 
DEFECT BASED ON THE INSTALLATION INSTRUCTIONS 22 
VI. CONCLUSION 25 
ADDENDUM 26 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Constitutional Provisions 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7 1 
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Sections 3 and 5 1 
Court Rules 
Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 1 
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 1 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 2, 14 
Rule 42, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 1 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 2 
Rule 75, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 14 
Cases 
Amatulli v. Delhi Constr. Corp., 
548 N.Y.S. 2d 774 (A.D. 1989) 24 
Aspen Airways, Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Airways, Inc., 
196 Colo. 285, 584 P.2d 629 (1978) 15 
Auerbach's Inc. v. Kimball, 
572 P.2d 376 (Utah 1977) 13 
Bangerter v. Poulton, 
663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983) 11 
Bowler v. Board of Trustees of School Dist. No. 392, 
101 Idaho 537, 617 P.2d 841 (1980) 15 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986), 
cited with approval in 
Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, 
742 P.2d 262 (Utah App. 1987) 20 
Eyster v. Borg-Warner Corp., 
131 Ga. App. 702, 206 S.E. 668 (1974) 24 
FMA Financial Corp. v. Hansen Dairy, Inc., 
617 P.2d 327 (Utah 1980) 23 
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Dev. Co., 
659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983) 11 
Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments, Ltd., 
754 P. 2d 89 (Utah App. 1988) 21 
Insley Mfg. Corp. v. Draper Bank & Trust, 
717 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1986) 11 
Jones v. Nuclear Pharmacy, Inc., 
741 P.2d 322 (10th Cir. 1984) 18 
Kinger v. Kepano, 
635 P.2d 938 (Hawaii 1981) 15 
Lindsay v. Gibbons and Reed, 
27 Utah 2d 419, 497 P.2d 28 (1972) 21 
Manning v. Ashland Oil Co., 
721 F.2d 192 (7th Cir. 1983) 25 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319 (1976) 18 
McMillan v. Anchorage Community Hosp., 
646 P.2d 857 (Alaska 1982) ..." 15 
Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 
697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985) 21 
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant & Co. 17 
Monumental Health Plan v. Department of Health, 
510 F. Supp. 244 (D. Md. 1981) 18 
Munoz v. Machner, 
590 P.2d 1352 (Wyo. 1979) 15, 17 
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 
669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983) 16 
Newsome v. Vanderbilt University, 
453 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Tenn. 1978) 18 
Ranum v. Colorado Real Estate Comm'n, 
713 P.2d 418 (Colo. App. 1985) 15 
Reed v. Pennwalt Corp., 
22 Wash. App. 719, 591 P.2d 478 (1970) 25 
Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, 
742 P.2d 262 (Utah App. 1987) 20 
iv 
Rupp v. Grantsville City, 
610 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980) 16 
Schmeiser v. Trus Joist Corp., 
273 Or. 120, 540 P.2d 998 (1975) 24 
Sorenson v. Larsen, 740 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1987) 11 
State v. Tucker, 
657 P.2d 755 (Utah 1982) 13, 14 
Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1987) 11 
Trees v. Lewis, 
738 P.2d 612 (Utah 1987) 13, 14 
United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 
93 N.M. 105, 597 P.2d 290 
cert, denied, 444 U.S. 911 (1979) 15, 17 
Utah County v. Brouwn, 
672 P.2d 83 (Utah 1983) 11 
Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 
685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984) 23 
I. JURISDICTION 
This appeal is brought pursuant to the provisions of Article 
VIII, Sections 3 and 5 of the Constitution of Utah and Rules 3, 4 
and 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
II. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
SMP, Inc., appeals from the Fourth Judicial District Court's 
entry of Summary Judgment in favor of AJ Industries, Inc., and 
Reyco Industries, Inc., on October 6, 1989. 
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether SMP waived the following issues by raising them 
for the first time on appeal: 
a. SMP was denied due process because of inadequate 
notice; 
b. Summary judgment should not have been entered before 
SMP concluded discovery; 
c. The installation instructions AJ/Reyco provided Thayco 
were inadequate. 
2. Whether SMP was denied due process based on the trial 
court's notice of hearing. 
3. Whether the trial court properly entered summary 
judgment for Respondents. 
IV. DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Constitutional Provisions: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7. 
Rules: 
Rule 56. Summary Judgment. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a 
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move 
with or without supporting affidavits for a summary 
judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall 
be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for 
the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of 
hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment 
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law. . . . 
Rule 56 (b) and (c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of Appellant. The brief of the appellant 
shall contain under appropriate headings and in the 
order indicated: . . . 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall 
first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the 
course of proceedings, and its disposition in the 
court below. A statement of the facts relevant to 
the issues presented for review shall follow. All 
statements of fact and references to the 
proceedings below shall be supported by citations 
to the record . . . . 
Rule 24(a)(7), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case. 
Plaintiff/Appellant SMP, Inc. ("SMP"), a trucking concern, 
purchased trailers from Defendant Fleet Sales and Leasing Company 
("Fleet") in 1985. The trailers were manufactured by Defendant 
Thayco Manufacturing, Inc. ("Thayco"), and contained component 
2 
parts—heavyweight suspension systems—manufactured and supplied 
to Thayco by Defendant/Respondent Reyco Industries, Inc., a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Defendant/Respondent AJ Industries, 
Inc. (collectively referred to as "AJ/Reyco"). SMP sued the 
above-referenced defendants, and others, alleging under several 
theories loss of income and property damage due to poor quality 
of the trailers. 
B. Course Of Proceedings And Disposition Below. 
SMP filed its Complaint on September 25, 1987. (R. at 1-
10.) After significant discovery and opportunity for discovery 
(R. at 18, 19, 37, 38, 50, 53, 58, 60, 62, 64, 66, 68, 69, 73, 
75, 77, 79, 81, 82, 84, 87, 90, 93 and 95), on May 31, 1989, 
AJ/Reyco filed a Motion for Summary Judgment as to all of SMP's 
claims against them, on grounds that no evidence existed to show 
AJ/Reyco breached a legal duty or any of their conduct 
proximately caused SMPfs injury. (R. at 112-22.) On June 19, 
1990, SMP filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 123-27), and later filed an opposing 
Affidavit (R. at 134-37), and AJ/Reyco filed a Reply Memorandum 
in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 152-64.) 
The Record is devoid of a Motion or Rule 56(f) Affidavit by SMP 
seeking additional time in which to conduct discovery and/or 
respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment, or an objection 
asking the Court not to rule upon the merits of the fully-briefed 
Motion for Summary Judgment. In fact, SMP requested oral 
argument of AJ/Reycofs Motion for Summary Judgment against it. 
(R. at 133.) 
Based upon SMP's request for oral argument, the Court sent 
counsel a notice of hearing, but inadvertently stated therein 
that AJ/Reycofs Ex Parte Application to File Overlength Reply 
Memorandum would be heard. (R. at 201.) Counsel for SMP 
appeared at the hearing and opposed and argued against the Motion 
for Summary Judgment. (R. at 202; Addendum A.) The Record lacks 
any objection to the notice, the hearing, or the Court ruling on 
the merits of the Motion for Summary Judgment. The Record is 
devoid of any reference to SMP seeking additional time in which 
to conduct discovery and/or respond to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
In a Ruling dated September 14, 1989, Judge Cullen Y. 
Christensen found no genuine issue of material fact with respect 
to SMP's claims against AJ/Reyco and ruled that AJ/Reyco were 
entitled to summary relief. (R. at 203-08; Addendum B.) 
AJ/Reyco filed a proposed form of Order of Summary Judgment to 
which SMP objected. The sole bases of the Objection were that 
(1) AJ/Reyco should not be entitled to costs, and (2) the Judge's 
Ruling had not stated that the matter should be "dismissed on the 
merits with prejudice.11 (R. at 211.) On October 6, 1989, the 
trial court entered the Order of Summary Judgment, overruling 
SMP!s two objections. (R. at 216-18; Addenda C, D.) 
On October 31, 1989, SMP filed a Notice of Appeal from the 
Court's Order of Summary Judgment. (R. at 225.) The Utah 
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction based 
on the pendency of SMPfs claims against other defendants and 
SMP's failure to have the Order of Summary Judgment certified as 
a final Order. (R. at 239.) On March 9, 1990, the District 
Court certified the Order of Summary Judgment as final under Rule 
54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. at 245.) SMP filed a 
Notice of Appeal on March 26, 1990 (R. at 251), and a Certificate 
of Transcript on March 26, 1990. (R. at 249.) The Certificate 
of Transcript states that, "Plaintiff/Appellant, SMP, Inc. has 
not requested a transcript of the Summary Judgment Hearing in 
regard to this matter and further certifies that same is not 
required by Plaintiff/Appellant on Appeal." (R. at 249.) 
C. Statement Of Facts And Citations To The Record. 
Plaintiff SMP is a Pennsylvania corporation and is doing 
business as an authorized motor carrier in Utah County, State of 
Utah. (R. at 1.) In March of 1985 and thereafter, SMP purchased 
from Defendant Fleet 77 new 1985 flatbed trailers for use in 
SMP's business. (R. at 1.) The 77 trailers were manufactured by 
Defendant Thayco in its South Hill, Virginia plant. (R. at 256 
(Thayer, pp. 14, 26).) No evidence exists in the Record to show 
that Respondents AJ/Reyco designed, manufactured, distributed or 
sold the trailers in question. 
In 1984 Thayco purchased the South Hill plant from a Watkins 
Manufacturing ("Watkins"). Thereafter, Thayco adopted and 
incorporated Watkins1 design and plans for the manufacture of 
Thayco flatbed trailers, including the 77 trailers eventually 
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sold to SMP. Thayco made no changes in the design, (R. at 255 
(Crough, pp. 20-24, 26-28, 31-32).) 
Lynn Docherty was the purchasing agent for Thayco and was 
responsible for purchasing the component parts for the flatbed 
trailers at the South Hill, Virginia plant. (R. at 257 
(Docherty, p. 7); R. at 255 (Crough, p. 98).) James F. Crough 
worked for Thayco in South Hill, Virginia beginning 1984 when 
Thayco purchased the plant from Watkins. (R. at 255 (Crough, p. 
20).) Mr. Crough was in charge of the manufacture and assembly 
of trailers at the time when Thayco manufactured the trailers 
that SMP eventually purchased. (R. at 255 (Crough, pp. 20-24); 
R. at 257 (Docherty, pp. 7).) 
Defendant/Respondent Reyco, a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Defendant/Respondent AJ, manufactured and supplied to Thayco 
component parts—heavyweight suspension assemblies—for certain 
of the Thayco flatbed trailers that eventually were sold to SMP. 
(R. at 255 (Crough, pp. 51-53, 99-101); R. at 257 (Docherty, pp. 
6-11, 16-17).) Reyco supplied to Thayco, by and through Mr. 
Docherty, the installation instructions and drawings for the 
Reyco heavyweight suspension assemblies. (R. at 257 (Docherty, 
pp. 9-11, 38).) The Reyco instructions and drawings for the 
suspension assemblies instructed the assembler to use a middle 
hanger cross pipe brace in the installation. (R. at 257 
(Docherty, pp. 9-11, 38, and Exhibit 16 thereto).) 
Thayco installed the Reyco heavy-weight suspension systems 
in the flatbed trailers using instead the Watkins instructions 
and drawings. (R. at 255 (Crough, p. 32).) Thayco installed the 
heavyweight suspension systems without incorporating a middle 
hanger cross pipe brace because (1) the Watkins design and 
instructions did not call for the brace and (2) a Thayco engineer 
had told Messrs. Crough and Docherty that such braces were 
unnecessary. (R. at 255 (Crough, pp. 32, 51-53, 64, 82, 84, 99, 
101, 131); R. at 257 (Docherty, pp. 9-11, 1(5-19, 25, 28-29, 38, 
40, 45).) Mr. Crough admitted in his deposition that he had 
received the Reyco installation instructions when he began 
assembling the heavyweight suspensions but that he did not follow 
those instructions. (R. at 255 (Crough, p. 101).)x 
In fact, Thaycofs purchasing agent, Mr. Docherty, did not 
discuss the installation of the Reyco suspension systems with Mr. 
Crough because he assumed that Mr. Crough was familiar with the 
correct procedures for installation of such suspension systems. 
(R. at 257 (Docherty, pp. 16, 29).) Mr. Docherty never discussed 
with Mr. Crough the fact that the Reyco instructions and drawings 
specified the installation of the cross pipe brace for the Reyco 
suspension assemblies. (R. at 257 (Docherty, pp. 29, 40).) Mr. 
Docherty, who was not the one who provided the instructions to 
Mr. Crough, assumed that Mr. Crough had cross pipe bracing 
aSMP asserts on appeal that although AJ/Reyco supplied the 
installation instructions to Thaycofs purchasing agent, Mr. 
Docherty, AJ/Reyco did not take steps to assure that the actual 
installer, Mr. Crough, received the instructions. The assertion 
overlooks Mr. Croughfs admission that he, in fact, had received 
the instructions when he began assembling the suspensions. See 
infra footnote 12. 
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available to him in South Hill, Virginia. (R. at 257 (Docherty, 
pp. 40).) The cross pipe bracing could be purchased locally at 
South Hill, Virginia, at less expense to Thayco than by 
purchasing it from Reyco, as needed for the Thayco trailer 
specifications. (R. at 255 (Crough, pp. 143-44).) 
Thayco never provided Reyco drawings of how it would install 
the suspension assemblies and of the particular design of the 
Thayco trailers; Reyco was unaware of the size of the cross pipe 
needed for installation of the suspension assemblies in the 
Thayco trailers. (R. at 255 (Crough, p. 144).) On two 
occasions, Bob Wells, an employee of Reyco, visited the Thayco 
facility in South Hill, Virginia and met with Mr. Crough. Mr. 
Crough could not testify whether Mr. Wells even observed any of 
the Thayco trailers, and he could not recall what he and Mr. 
Wells had looked at. All deliveries of trailers were made to SMP 
before the second visit. (R. at 255 (Crough, pp. 49, 103).) 
Plaintiff alleged that from the spring of 1985 to the date 
of filing the lawsuit and beyond, the Thayco flatbed trailers 
malfunctioned and failed to perform because the steel in the 
frames and slider frames cracked, rendering the trailers in 
violation of safety standards. (R. at 1.) SMP alleged property 
damage, business damage, and other damage arising out of the 
design, manufacture and sale of the trailers. (R. at 1.) SMP 
also alleged that the trailers were defective and unreasonably 
dangerous. Based on its factual allegations, SMP alleged five 
causes of action as against all defendants, including AJ/Reyco. 
(R. at 1.) 
The Record lacks any facts tending to show (1) that the 
heavyweight suspensions were defective in any way, or (2) that 
the cracking in the steel frames and slider frames was the 
proximate result of any manufacturing, design or instruction 
defect(s) in the heavyweight suspensions. In addition, Appellant 
SMP has admitted that had Thayco followed the Reyco instructions 
for installation of the suspension systems, and included cross 
pipes, the cracking would not have occurred. (R. at 125, P 10.) 
However, no evidence in the Record suggests that the absence of 
cross pipe bracing was a proximate cause of the injury.2 
Based upon the state of the Record, as set forth above, and 
SMP!s failure to controvert any material facts (see R. at 123-
25), Judge Cullen Y. Christensen granted AJ/Reyco's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (R. at 203-08, 217-18; Addenda B,D.) AJ/Reyco 
incorporate by this reference B. Course Of Proceedings And 
Disposition Below, supra, as though fully set forth herein, 
2AJ/Reyco do not admit that the cracking in the steel 
occurred because Thayco failed to install the cross pipe brace. 
AJ/Reyco contend that the cracking in the steel frames and slider 
frames would have occurred with £r without the cross pipe brace, 
because of the poor quality of Thaycofs trailers, and therefore 
the component part suspension assemblies had no connection to 
SMPfs alleged injury. However, even if the Court assumes that 
the absence of cross pipe bracing was a factor in the cracking of 
the trailers, which is unsupported by the Record, it does not 
affect the merits of the Motion for Summary Judgment because 
Reyco gave installation instructions which included the cross 
pipe bracing. 
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because those facts bear directly on the merits of issues SMP 
raises for the first time on appeal. 
In addition, SMPfs Brief sets forth no citations to the 
Record on Appeal as support for the conclusory allegations in its 
Statement of Facts. (Appellant's Brief at 2-3.) 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
SMP raised several issues for the first time on appeal and 
therefore waived those issues. They include (1) the assertion 
that SMP?s due process rights were violated based on the trial 
courtfs notice of hearing; (2) the claim that the Order of 
Summary Judgment was entered before SMP could complete discovery; 
and (3) the claim that AJ/Reycofs instructions were inadequate. 
In addition, SMP makes several factual claims in its 
Statement of Facts and throughout its Argument. None of those 
claims are supported by or cited to the Record. For that reason, 
this Court should assume the correctness of the trial courtfs 
ruling on the Summary Judgment Motion. 
SMPfs due process rights were not violated or deprived 
because SMP had full and fair opportunity to present its 
objections and opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, 
both in writing and orally. 
SMP!s case against AJ/Reyco is based in speculation and 
conjecture, clearly insufficient alternatives to proof under Utah 
law. No facts in the record establish the essential elements of 
SMP's claims, including fault and proximate cause. SMPfs claims 
rest entirely on conclusory allegations. 
Finally, AJ/Reyco supplied proper installation instructions 
to SMP, which SMP chose not to follow. The law does not impose a 
duty on a component-part supplier to make certain that the 
manufacturer installs the part according to the installation 
instructions. AJ/Reyco exhausted their duty by providing Thayco 
the instructions. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SMP WAIVED THE ISSUES IT RAISES 
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
The Utah Supreme Court has forcefully and consistently held 
that an appeals court will not consider issues raised before it 
for the first time. Sorenson v. Larsen, 740 P.2d 1336 (Utah 
1987); Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101, 1103 Utah 1987); Insley 
Mfg. Corp. v. Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 (Utah 
1986). In Franklin Financial v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 
1040, 1045 (Utah 1983), the Court stated that the record must 
clearly show that an issue was "timely presented to the trial 
court in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon; we 
cannot assume that it was properly raised." If a party fails to 
present an issue to the trial court, it will have "waived the 
right to raise it" on appeal. Utah County v. Brouwn, 672 P.2d 
83, 85 (Utah 1983). "It is axiomatic that defenses and claims 
not raised by the parties in the trial [court] cannot be 
considered for the first time on appeal." Bangerter v. Poulton, 
663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983). 
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Because SMP did not raise the following issues at the trial 
court level, those issues are waived and should not be considered 
by this Court: 
A. Due Process Violation Based On Claimed Inadequate Notice. 
SMP claims that the trial courtfs notice of hearing was 
inadequate to apprise SMP of the true nature of the hearing and 
that SMP!s due process rights were therefore violated. The 
Record contains no citation or reference to any objection by SMP 
or its attorney that the notice was inadequate, that SMP desired 
more time to prepare for oral argument or that SMP was unprepared 
to proceed at the hearing. Because SMP raises this issue for the 
first time on appeal, the issue is waived.3 
B. Granting Summary Judgment Before Plaintiff Had Opportunity 
To Conduct Its Discovery. 
SMP claims that it had further discovery to conduct before a 
hearing and ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment was 
appropriate. The Record contains SMPfs Memorandum in Opposition 
to the Motion for Summary Judgment and an accompanying Affidavit, 
which do not raise that issue. The Record does not contain a 
Rule 56(f) Affidavit asking for more time in which to conduct 
discovery or otherwise asking for more time to respond to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Ironically, the Record also 
contains SMP!s Request for Oral Argument on the Motion for 
3The claim of denial of due process also fails on the merits 
for the reasons set forth in POINT III, infra. 
Summary Judgment. Because SMP raises this argument for the first 
time on appeal, it is waived,* 
C. Reyco's Installation Instructions To Thayco Were Inadequate. 
In unsupported and conclusory allegations, SMP contends that 
Reycofs instructions to Thayco were inadequate. SMP made no such 
allegation at the trial court level in response to the Motion for 
Summary Judgment and it is therefore waived.5 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD ASSUME THE CORRECTNESS 
OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that it will 
assume the correctness of the judgment below where, as here, an 
appellant does not support the facts set forth in its brief with 
citations to the Record. Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 613 (Utah 
1987); State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756-57 (Utah 1982). In 
Trees, the Court stated that it 
will assume the correctness of the judgment below where 
counsel on appeal does not comply with the requirements 
*SMP cites Auerbach's Inc. v. Kimball, 572 P.2d 376 (Utah 
1977) as support that the Motion for Summary Judgment should not 
have been granted because SMPfs discovery was not complete. In 
Auerbach1s, Kimball had discovery requests outstanding at the 
time the Court entered Summary Judgment against Kimball, and over 
Kimball's specific objection. Kimball sought additional time 
because the outstanding discovery, he claimed, specifically 
addressed the issues on summary judgment. The Supreme Court 
reversed, stating that the Motion should have been continued 
until Kimball completed the discovery he thought necessary. 
In this case, SMP had no discovery outstanding, had 
conducted deposition discovery, and did not ask the Court to 
continue the Motion for Summary Judgment for any purpose. 
5The allegation fails for the additional reasons set forth 
in POINT V, infra. 
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of Rule 75(p)(2)(2)(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
as to making a concise statement of facts and citation 
of the pages in the record where they are supported,6 
738 P.2d at 613. (Citations omitted.) Similarly, in State v. 
Tucker, the Court concluded that: 
A separate and independent basis for the affirmance of 
the trial court is that the defendant failed to refer 
to any portion of the record that factually supports 
his contentions on appeal. 
657 P.2d at 756-57. 
In support of its argument that a genuine fact question 
exists and that summary judgment was improper, Appellant SMP sets 
forth factual assertions on pages 2-3 of its Brief, SMP also 
makes various factual assertions throughout its argument which 
find no support in the Record and are not cited to the Record.7 
The assertions are conclusory, unsupported and insupportable by 
the Record. For that reason, this Court should assume the 
6Rule 24(a)(7), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
ultimately replaced former Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
75(p)(2)(2)(d), but did not alter the requirement that appellant 
cite specifically to the record to support the fact statements 
and assertions in the brief. See Trees, 738 P.2d at 613, n.3 
(replaced by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(6), effective 
January 1985). 
7
 For example, on page 9 of its Brief, SMP states: 
Reyco and AJ take several positions which do not agree 
with the facts as alleged by SMP. For example, they 
argue that they are mere suppliers who had no part in 
selecting the products. SMP has alleged otherwise. 
(Emphasis supplied.) SMP raises other such purported fact issues 
throughout its Argument. Two problems exist with SMP!s 
contentions. First, no reference is made to the Record. And 
second, SMP assumes it can raise genuine issues of material fact 
with mere allegations. 
correctness of the trial court's entry of judgment below for 
AJ/Reyco. 
POINT III 
SMP WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS 
The question under a procedural due process analysis is 
whether a party, under the particular circumstances of its case, 
has a fair opportunity to oppose or present objections to 
adversarial conduct that would impair a constitutionally 
protected interest. Kinger v. Kepano, 635 P.2d 938, 942 (Hawaii 
1981); Ranum v. Colorado Real Estate Comm!n, 713 P.2d 418, 419 
(Colo. App. 1985). What is fair is not based on an established 
or universal standard of conduct but rather depends on the 
circumstances of the particular case. See, e.g., McMillan v. 
Anchorage Community Hosp., 646 P.2d 857 (Alaska 1982); Aspen 
Airways, Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Airways, Inc., 196 Colo. 285, 584 
P.2d 629 (1978); Bowler v. Board of Trustees of School Dist. No. 
392, 101 Idaho 537, 617 P.2d 841 (1980); United Nuclear Corp. v. 
General Atomic Co., 93 N.M. 105, 597 P.2d 290, cert, denied, 444 
U.S. 911 (1979); Munoz v. Machner, 590 P.2d 1352 (Wyo. 1979). As 
the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"Due process" is not a technical concept that can be 
reduced to a formula with a fixed content unrelated to 
time, place, and circumstances. Rather, "the demands 
of due process rest on the concept of basic fairness of 
procedure and demand a procedure appropriate to the 
case and just to the parties involved." 
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Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983)8 (quoting 
Rupp v. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338, 341 (Utah 1980)). A 
determination of "when the process demands are met requires a 
eSMP cites Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983), an 
alienation of affection case, as support that SMP was denied due 
process based on inadequate notice. SMP misstates the critical 
distinguishing factor in Nelson by stating that the notice went 
to "counsel." In fact, defendant was a non-lawyer who 
represented himself in the trial after having two days notice 
before the trial began. Justice Oaks' opinion addresses the 
fairness of the notice and emphasizes that a fair "opportunity to 
present . . . objections" is the critical ingredient of due 
process that was missing. He emphasized the inexperience of a 
lay person in this situation as bearing on the question of 
fairness: 
To a member of the bar or even to a layperson 
experienced with trial proceedings, setting a case for 
"hearing" could have been understood as setting a case 
for "trial." But to this uneducated and inexperienced 
defendant, a setting for "hearing" was not a clear 
notice that the defendant had to be ready for trial on 
that date. . . . 
[W]e have also cautioned that "because of his lack of 
technical knowledge of law and procedure [a layman 
acting as his own attorney] should be accorded every 
consideration that may reasonably be indulged." . . . 
The deficiency in this case concerns what happened 
before the trial. The vulnerability of a layman who is 
unrepresented as he approaches a trial of the legal and 
factual complexity of this case requires more judicial 
consideration than was extended here. Most 
importantly, defendant was not clearly informed of the 
date of trial until two days before it was to begin. 
That deficiency jeopardized one of the most important 
ingredients of due process: time to prepare a defense. 
Id. at 1213. 
In this case, SMP was represented by counsel who fully briefed 
the issues before the trial court on summary judgment, requested 
oral argument on the Motion and argued against the Motion at the 
hearing. SMP was not denied the "opportunity to present 
objections" or be heard in its opposition to the Motion. 
decision as to whether, upon the whole course of proceedings and 
in all the attending circumstances, there was a denial of 
fundamental fairness," which is "a question of judgment and 
degree." Munoz v. Maschner, 590 P.2d 1352, 1355 (Wyo. 1979) 
(emphasis supplied). 
Fair and adequate notice under due process analysis does not 
necessarily mean notice of a hearing, as suggested by SMP; rather 
the concept of fair notice means being apprised of the 
claims/allegations/charges against a party and having a fair and 
meaningful opportunity to be heard in response, based on the 
particular circumstances of the case. Courts recognize that an 
oral hearing, where the parties have submitted information to the 
judge or court, is not a right under the due process clause 
because the person was afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity 
to be heard on the issues, albeit in writing. For example in 
United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 93 N.M. 105, 597 P.2d 
290 (1979), the court stated: 
GAC claims that the failure to accord it a hearing was 
a violation of its due process rights. The 
requirements of due process are not technical, and no 
particular form of procedure is necessary for 
protecting substantive rights. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant 
Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). The circumstances of the 
case dictate the requirements. . . . The integrity of 
the fact-finding process and the basic fairness of the 
decision are the principal considerations. . . . Oral 
argument on a motion is not a due process right. . , . 
The parties had full opportunity to brief the facts and 
the law, and they filed extensive briefs with the court 
before this decision. Both sides filed requested 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
597 P.2d at 308-09 (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted). 
Similarly, in Jones v. Nuclear Pharmacy, Inc., 741 F.2d 322 
(10th Cir. 1984), the Court stated: 
Appellant was afforded the full panoply of procedural 
due process when he received adequate notice of the 
settlement hearing and had the significant opportunity 
to be heard by submitting an extensive memorandum to 
the court prior to the hearing detailing his objection 
to the settlement. The failure to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing when all parties concerned with the 
settlement had notice of the settlement hearing, the 
opportunity to be heard, and access to the fruits of 
detailed discovery, is not a violation of due process. 
Id. at 325 (emphasis supplied). See also Monumental Health Plan 
v. Department of Health, 510 F. Supp. 244, 248 (D. Md. 1981) 
("The major thrust of Monumentalfs due process hearing argument 
is that it should have been granted an oral hearing before the 
agency took action on its qualification or its loan installment. 
The Court finds this argument to be unpersuasive. Simply because 
a party was not afforded an oral hearing does not necessarily 
mean he has been denied due process"); Newsome v. Vanderbilt 
University, 453 F. Supp. 401, 424 (M.D. Tenn. 1978) ("At the core 
of due process is of course a requirement that individuals be 
given an effective opportunity to present affirmative evidence 
and to refute adverse evidence, though not necessarily at an oral 
hearing") (emphasis supplied) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319, 348, 349 (1976)). Faulty notice of an oral hearing on 
the Motion could not offend constitutional notions of fairness if 
a procedural due process right to an oral hearing does not exist 
—especially where the responding party has notice of the Motion 
and opportunity to object and oppose it in writing, as here. The 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Code of Judicial 
Administration, through the briefing process afforded SMP, 
provided such fair and meaningful opportunity for SMP to object 
and be heard fully on the issues raised in the Summary Judgment 
Motion. 
Based on the foregoing, the question is whether SMP was 
denied a fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard on the 
issues raised in the Motion for Summary Judgment. SMP received 
notice of AJ/Reyco's Motion for Summary Judgment and responded 
thereto, in writing, with a Memorandum in Opposition filed with 
and considered by the trial court. Thereafter, SMP also filed an 
Affidavit in opposition to the Motion. After AJ/Reyco filed 
their reply, SMP requested oral argument on the Motion— 
presumably when SMP had completed its briefing. The trial court, 
through inadvertence, sent notice of a hearing on an Ex Parte 
Application to File Overlength Memorandum. However, trial courts 
as a matter of course grant such applications without hearing, 
something SMP!s counsel knew or reasonably should have known. At 
the hearing, SMP!s counsel appeared, argued and opposed the 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and the trial court took the Motion 
under advisement. The Record is silent with respect to any 
objection to the form of notice, or any request for additional 
time to prepare written or oral argument in opposition to the 
Motion. Because SMP was afforded a fair and reasonable 
opportunity to oppose the Motion and be heard, both orally and in 
writing, in its opposition thereto, SMP was not denied procedural 
due process. 
POINT IV 
THE RECORD CONTAINS NO FACTS TO SUPPORT A PRIMA FACIE 
CASE AGAINST AJ/REYCO UNDER ANY OF SMPfS THEORIES 
In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986), 
cited with approval in Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 
P.2d 262 (Utah App. 1987), the Court stated: 
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates 
the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for 
discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to 
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of 
an element essential to that party's case, and on which 
that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In 
such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to 
any material fact" since a complete failure of proof 
concerning an essential element of the non-moving 
party's case necessarily renders all other facts 
immaterial. The moving party is "entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law" because the non-moving party has 
failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential 
element of her case with respect to which she has the 
burden of proof. "[T]h[e] standard [for granting 
summary judgment] mirrors the standard for a directed 
verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
SMP has no evidence that the suspension assemblies were 
defective or that any alleged defect in them was the proximate 
cause of the cracking in the trailers. Even assuming SMP had 
shown a connection between Thaycofs failure to install the cross 
pipe brace and the cracking in the trailers, Reyco provided the 
proper installation instructions to Thayco, satisfying its duty. 
See infra, POINT V. SMP's claims and factual assertions against 
AJ/Reyco are based in speculation and conjecture and not in any 
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evidence in the Record. The "plaintiff must present sufficient 
evidence to establish a prima facie case against the defendant in 
order to have his cause submitted for consideration by the jury." 
Lindsay v. Gibbons and Reed, 27 Utah 2d 419, 497 P.2d 28, 30 
(1972). A prima facie case requires that each element of the 
cause of action be based in "substantial evidence": "Absent 
substantial evidence of any proof of negligence or cause, 'an 
inference of both amounts to nothing more than impermissible 
speculation and conjecture.1"9 Gregory v. Fourthwest 
Investments, Ltd., 754 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah App. 1988) (citation 
omitted). Where SMPfs evidence, at best, does not establish any 
one or more elements of its claims as more likely than not, 
plaintiff has failed to meet the threshold requirement. See, 
e.g., Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985). 
SMP fails its burden with respect to every element of its claims 
against AJ/Reyco because its entire case, after discovery and 
9This Court defines "substantial evidence" as "evidence 
. , . which furnishes a substantial basis of fact from which the 
issues tendered can reasonably be resolved." Gregory, 754 P.2d 
at 92 n.2 (citation omitted). 
opportunity for discovery,10 still is based in unsubstantiated, 
conclusory allegations.1X 
Without evidence to show that AJ/Reyco failed to exercise 
reasonable care with respect to SMP, that their product was 
flawed or unreasonably dangerous, or that their product was the 
proximate cause of SMP's property damage, SMP's claims against 
Respondents AJ/Reyco fail for lack of evidence. 
POINT V 
SMP STATES NO COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR PRODUCT 
DEFECT BASED ON THE INSTALLATION INSTRUCTIONS 
The facts are undisputed that Thayco, by and through its 
purchasing agent, obtained the necessary drawings and 
instructions for proper installation of the suspension 
10SMP asserts that the Order of Summary Judgment was 
inappropriate because the Order was entered before SMP had 
opportunity to conduct its discovery. Appellant's Brief at 10. 
The merits of that assertion are suspect because (1) the 
Complaint was filed two years before the Order was entered, 
giving SMP sufficient time to conduct discovery, (2) AJ/Reyco did 
nothing to inhibit SMP's discovery efforts, (3) discovery was in 
fact conducted by SMP, see R. at 84, 87, 90, 95, 255, 256 and 257 
(Depositions of Thayer, Crough, Faires, Docherty and Metcalt, at 
which SMPfs counsel was in attendance and asked questions), (4) 
no discovery was filed or sought by SMP after AJ/Reyco filed 
their Motion for Summary Judgment, and (5) SMP did not file a 
motion or Rule 56(f) Affidavit seeking more time in which to 
respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment or to conduct 
discovery. 
ia
-AJ/Reyco do not dispute the authority cited in SMP!s Brief 
that negligence cases generally present fact questions that 
cannot be resolved summarily by the court. However, those cases 
presuppose the existence of sufficient evidence to raise a fact 
question going to the matter asserted, e.g., negligence, breach, 
proximate cause, defective product, etc. SMP's case does not 
rise to that level because the evidence, as a matter of law, is 
insufficient to state a prima facie case. 
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assemblies. It is undisputed that Mr. Crough did receive these 
instructions when he began assembling the suspensions.12 It is 
undisputed that Thayco failed to follow the instructions for two 
reasons: (1) the engineer for Thayco had instructed Mr. Crough 
that a cross pipe brace was unnecessary; and (2) the Watkins1 
instructions Thayco used did not call for a cross pipe brace. 
SMP has admitted that had Thayco followed the instructions, no 
loss would have occurred.13 Now, in conclusory form, SMP 
contends that Reyco's instructions to Thayco1* or method of 
instructing Thayco were inadequate. However, this argument fails 
because (1) no evidence in the Record supports the allegation, 
(2) an instruction cannot be considered defective or unsafe if it 
was not read or heeded and (3) a component part supplier exhausts 
its duty by providing instructions to the manufacturer. 
X2Even assuming that Mr. Crough had not obtained the 
installation instructions, as alleged by SMP, the facts are 
undisputed that Mr. Docherty, SMPfs purchasing agent with whom 
Thayco was dealing, received the instructions. Mr. Docherty did 
not think it important to pass along the instructions to Mr. 
Crough because he thought Mr. Crough knew what he was doing and 
did not need them. (R. at 90 (Docherty, pp, 16, 29).) Agency 
law imputes the knowledge of an agent to the principal, whether 
or not the agent informs the principal. Xanthos v. Board of 
Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984); FMA 
Financial Corp. v. Hansen Dairy, Inc., 617 P.2d 327 (Utah 1980). 
Reyco satisfied its duty by giving installation instructions to 
the person whom Thayco had designated as its purchasing agent 
—Mr. Docherty. 
13See supra, footnote 2. 
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*As discussed under POINT I above, the alleged inadequacy 
of the instructions is raised for the first time on appeal. 
SMPfs contention suggests that a component part supplier has 
a duty to make certain that the manufacturer who incorporates the 
component must do so properly and in accordance with the 
suppliers instructions. The law does not, for good reason, 
extend one's duty to that extreme, A seller who gives a product 
instruction or warning may reasonably assume that it will be read 
and heeded. Schmeiser v. Trus Joist Corp., 273 Or. 120, 540 P.2d 
998 (1975). A component supplier exhausts its duty by providing 
instructions to the manufacturer for safe and proper installation 
of the component. Where the manufacturer does not heed the 
instructions, no liability attaches to the component-supplier. 
See, e.g., Eyster v. Borg-Warner Corp., 131 Ga. App. 702, 206 
S.E.2d 668 (1974) ("instructions specifically directed the use of 
copper wire [and that] the unit should be installed in accordance 
with national and electrical codes"; manufacturer's failure to 
follow instructions did not establish liability on the component 
supplier); Amatulli v. Delhi Constr. Corp., 548 N.Y.S. 2d 774 
(A.D. 1989) ("Under the circumstances, the defects alleged are 
insufficient, as a matter of law, to raise a factual issue 
regarding Seasprayfs liability. The pool was safe when it left 
the manufacturer's plant. If it had been installed in accordance 
with the manufacturer's specifications, . . . the depth of the 
pool would have been obvious. . . . The law imposes no further 
obligation on the part of the manufacturer to enforce its clear 
instructions . . . " ) . A supplier fulfills its duty when it gives 
adequate warning or instruction to the intermediate buyer which 
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is a large industrial concern with its own programs and methods 
of distribution and where the supplier has no effective means to 
communicate instructions or warnings to the ultimate users. Reed 
v. Pennwalt Corp., 22 Wash. App. 719, 591 P.2d 478 (1970). 
Indeed, a manufacturer reasonably relies on a learned middleman, 
who is to incorporate the component into its own product, where 
the middleman is knowledgeable and experienced. Manning v. 
Ashland Oil Co., 721 F.2d 192 (7th Cir. 1983). 
Mr. Crough!s failure to use the drawings is something over 
which AJ/Reyco had no control and no right of control. Reyco 
could not force or require compliance with its instructions and 
drawings. Reycofs duty was reasonably exhausted when it supplied 
the proper and safe installations instructions and drawings to 
Thayco. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For these reasons the trial court's Order for Summary 
Judgment should be affirmed. 
DATED this iS^ day of CK*AJL^ , 1990. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & hJA£IXM£AU 
By 
Raymond M. Bfcrry 
Richard A. Van Wagoner 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Respondents Reyco Industries, 
Inc., and AJ Industries, Inc. 
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ADDENDUM A 
FILED !N _. 
4TH DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SMP, INC., MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, CASE NUMBER: CV-87-2238 
vs. DATE: August 18, 1989 
THAYCO MANUFACTURING INC. et al, CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE 
Defendant. Rept.: E.V. Quist, CSR 
UNDER ADVISEMENT 
This was the time set for hearing Def Reyco and 
A.J.Industries Motion for Summary Judgment. Joseph Nemelka 
appeared as counsel for the plaintiff, Raymond M. Berry as 
counsel for Reyco Industries, Inc. and AJ Industries Inc. and Don 
R. Petersen as counsel for Def Thayco Manufacturing. 
Mr. Berry addressed the Court and argued his Motion for 
Summary Juidgment. Counsel requested the depositions of James F. 
Crough and Lynn Docherty be published at this time. 
The Court granted the request and depositions allowed 
published. 
Mr. Nemelka objected to the Summary Judgment Motion and 
argued same. 
Rebuttal argument made. 
Mr. Petersen stated he has not joined in the Motion for 
Summary Judgment and has nothing to add. 
The Court took the matter under advisement. 
ADDENDUM B 
FILED IN 
4™ DISTRICT COURT 
STAT£ C- UTAH 
DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
$E? i'i 3 ?9 fif '39 
SMP, Inc., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THAYCO MANUFACTURING, INC., 
et al., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-87-2238 
RULING 
This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 
4-501, on the motion of defendants Reyco Industries., Inc. and 
AJ Industries, Inc. seeking summary judgment. The Court has 
reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of counsel, 
entertained argument of counsel, and upon being advised in 
the premises, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS 
The Court finds that the following material facts 
are not disputed: 
1. Lynn Docherty was the purchasing agent for 
Thayco Manufacturing, Inc., (hereinafter "Thayco") and was 
responsible for purchasing the suspension assembly kits for 
the Thayco trailer manufacturing concern in South Hill, 
Virginia. 
2. James F. Crough worked for Thayco in South 
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Hill, Virginia as plant manager beginning in 1984 when 
Thayco purchased a trailer manufacturing concern from 
Watkins Manufacturing, (hereinafter "Watkins11). 
3. Mr. Crough was in charge of the manufacture 
and assembly of trailers for Thayco at the time when Thayco 
manufactured trailers that were eventually sold to the 
plaintiff. 
4. When Thayco manufactured the trailers that 
eventually were sold to the plaintiff, Mr. Crough and Thayco 
simply used drawings and instructions obtained from Watkins 
when Thayco purchased the business because Thayco made no 
design changes in the trailers. 
5. Thayco manufactured the trailers without including 
crosspipe braces in the suspension assemblies because the 
Watkins instructions and drawings did not call for the cross-
pipe and because Mr. Kinkle, a Thayco engineer, had told 
Messrs. Crough and Docherty that they were not necessary. 
6. Reyco supplied to Thayco by and through Thaycofs 
purchasing agent Lynn Docherty, installation instructions and 
drawings for the Thayco suspension assemblies. In addition, 
Mr. Crough had in his possession prior to any assembly of 
the Reyco kit into the subject trailers a copy of the Reyco 
sales manual which indicated the necessity of installing 
crosspipes and reinforcement plates as part of the assembly 
process. 
7. The installation instructions and drawings 
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for the suspension assemblies instruct the assembler to use 
crosspipe braces in the installation. 
8. When Thayco manufactured the trailers in 
question, Mr. Crough had not received the Reyco suspension 
assembly and instructions from Mr. Docherty. 
9. Thayco's purchasing agent, Mr. Docherty, did not 
discuss the installation of the Reyco suspension systems with 
Mr. Crough because he assumed that Mr. Crough was familiar 
with the correct procedures for installation of such suspension 
systems. 
10. Thaycofs purchasing agent, Mr. Docherty, the 
person who received from Reyco the installation instructions 
and drawings that specified the need for a crosspipe brace, 
never discussed with Mr. Crough the fact that Reyco instruc-
tions and drawings specified the use of crosspipe bracing 
for the Reyco suspension assemblies. 
11. Mr. Docherty, who failed to pass on the 
instructions to Mr. Crough, assumed that Mr. Crough had 
crosspipe bracing available to him in South Hill, Virginia. 
12. The crosspipe bracing could be purchased locally 
at South Hill, Virginia, at less expense to Thayco than it 
could be by purchasing it from Reyco; that as a matter of 
industry practice, suspension manufacturers do not sell nor 
include pipe bracing with their suspension system kits. 
13. Thayco never provided Reyco with drawings of 
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how it was going to install the suspension assemblies and 
of the particular design of its trailers, so Reyco was unaware 
of the size of scabplate and crosspipe needed for assembly 
in the Thayco trailers. 
14. On two occasions, Bob Wells, an employee of 
Reyco, visited the Thayco facility in South Hill and met with 
Mr. Crough. Mr. Crough could not testify whether Mr. Wells 
observed any of the trailers that Thayco had manufactured, 
and he could not recall what he and Mr. Wells had looked at. 
However, all deliveries of trailers had been made to SMP 
before the second visit. 
15. That said defendants did not design, manufacture, 
sell or distribute the trailers in question, but: only supplied 
a component part, suspension assemblies. 
16. That the plaintiff admits that the lack of 
installation of a crosspipe brace in the said suspension 
assemblies by Thayco was a proximate cause of plaintifffs 
damage and that had Thayco properly installed the suspension 
assemblies with crosspipe braces, said suspension assemblies 
furnished by defendants Reyco and AJ Industries would not 
have been a proximate cause of plaintiff's property damage. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Based upon the foregoing the Court concludes as 
follows: 
1. That as a matter of law, said defendants are 
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entitled to summary judgment in their favor. 
The only potential issue of disputed fact arises 
by reason of plaintiff's assertion that an agent of said 
defendants, while at the Thayco plant, and after observing 
what was being done, said "everything is all right.11 However, 
plaintiff's witness could not say whether the defendants' 
agent actually looked at any trailers which had -been manu-
factured or what it was that said agent saw. Such an assertion 
is not, in the opinion of the Court, sufficient to raise a 
genuine issue of fact. What the agent actually saw or to 
what he was referring when such statement was made can only 
be mere speculation and as such could not form any basis 
upon which the trier of fact ought to be permitted to base 
a judgment. 
Plaintiff also contends that since, in its view, 
said defendants changed the design of their spring hanger 
assembly after Thayco had installed the defendants' assemblies 
in the trailer which plaintiff ultimately purchased, such 
alleged action creates a genuine issue of material fact of 
negligent design. The Court does not believe that such 
action by said defendants, if true, would give rise to the 
result for which plaintiffs contend and the Court adopts the 
argument of the defendants in this regard as follows: 
"First, Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
common sense require that evidence supporting or opposing 
summary judgment be admissible in evidence. Rule 407, Utah 
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Rules of Evidence, precludes the admissibility of subsequent 
remedial measures fto prove negligence or culpable conduct 
in connection with the event.1 Where such evidence is 
inadmissible for the very purpose for which plaintiff makes 
the assertion, it cannot be used on summary judgment to create 
a fact issue. 
"Second, and more significantly, the plaintiff admits in 
its fact paragraph 10 that the lack of the crosspipe brace 
was a proximate cause of plaintiff's property damage. 
Plaintiff!s implicit admission is that had the crosspipe 
braces been properly installed according to the Reyco instruc-
tions and drawings, there would have been no problem, at least 
none caused by the Reyco product. Plaintifffs post hoc 
contention of subsequent remedial measures to show negligence 
or fault has no place where the supplied product was safe 
if used according to the instructions and drawings that 
accompanied it.11 
ORDER 
1. Counsel for said defendants is directed to 
prepare and serve an appropriate summary judgment in their 
favor consistent with the foregoing. 
Dated this /<-/ day of September 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
ADDENDUM C 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SMP INC., 
Plaintiff, CASE NUMBER: CV 87 2238 
vs. RULING 
THAYCO MANUFACTURING INC. et al, 
Defendants. 
This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-501, 
on the objections of Pi to the form of the proposed Summary 
Judgment in favor of Defs Aj Industries Inc and Reyco Industries 
Inc submitted pursuant to the Ruling of the Court filed Sept 14, 
1989. The Court has reviewed the file, considered the memoranda 
of counsel, and upon being advised in the premises, now makes the 
following: 
RULING 
1. Said objections are overruled and the proposed 
Summary Judgment heretofore submitted by counsel for said Defs 
has been signed this date. 
Dated this /h day of October, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
^z: 
;ULLEN~Y^CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE 
cc: Joseph N. Nemelka Jr., Esq. 
Raymond M. Berry, Esq. 
Don R. Petersen, Esq. 
ADDENDUM D 
RAYMOND M. BERRY - A0310 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants Reyco 
Industries and AJ Industries 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SMP, INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THAYCO MANUFACTURING, INC., a 
corporation; FLEET SALES AND 
LEASING COMPANY, a corpora-
tion; AJ INDUSTRIES, INC., a 
corporation; REYCO INDUSTRIES, 
INC., a corporation; and ERIE 
WHEELS DIVISION OF ERIE 
MALLEABLE IRON COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
AJ INDUSTRIES, INC. AND REYCO 
INDUSTRIES, INC. 
Civil No. CV87-2238 
Judge Cullen Y. Christensen 
The Motion of Defendants Reyco Industries, Inc. and AJ 
Industries, Inc. for Summary Judgment in their favor that Plain-
tiff take nothing from them came on for hearing before the above-
entitled Court on Friday, August 18, 1989, Honorable Cullen Y. 
Christensen, District Judge, presiding, Joseph N. Nemelka, Jr. 
appearing for Plaintiff SMP, Inc., Raymond M. Berry appearing for 
Defendants Reyco Industries, Inc. and AJ Industries, Inc., the 
depositions of Lynn Docherty and James Crough having been 
published, the issues having been briefed by counsel for the 
respective parties, the arguments of counsel having been heard 
and the Court having been duly advised in the premises and made 
Findings and Fact and Conclusions of Law ruling that there is no 
genuine issue of any material pact and that the facts that were 
material were not disputed as set forth in the Court's Ruling of 
September 14, 1989, 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is ordered and adjudged that SMP, 
Inc. take nothing from Reyco Industries, Inc. and AJ Industries, 
Inc. and that plaintiff's action against them be dismissed on the 
merits with prejudice and that Defendants Reyco Industries, Inc. 
and AJ Industries, Inc. recover from the Plaintiff SMP, Inc. 
their costs of action. 
DATED this t? day of . 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that on the 25th day of June, 1990, and 
caused four (4) true and correct copies of the Brief of 
Defendants/ Respondents Reyco Industries, Inc. and AJ Industries, 
Inc. to be served upon the following: 
Joseph N. Nemelka, Jr. 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
7001 South 900 East, Suite 210A 
Midvale, UT 84047 
Richard A. Van Wagoner 
